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In the face of perceived environmental threats, especially from climate change, 
environmental sociology has become increasingly focused on uncertainty and precaution. 
Various contributors to the sociological literature (for example, Furedi, Ewald, and Shaw) 
offer useful insights into the way uncertainty and precaution are being formulated in 
regard to environmental risk, particularly the risk of climate change. Their insights can be 
complemented by a different set of insights, into the nitty-gritty of the complex legal 
mechanisms being forged in common-law countries to guide institutional and individual 
actors as to how the law calculates risk, particularly by formulating a technical legal 
device, ‘the precautionary principle’. This paper, in addressing a small element of this 
lacuna in the impressive sociological literature about environmental risks, focuses on 
legal deliberations of the risks of climate change in one region of Australia, the 
Gippsland coast in Victoria. 
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In the face of perceived environmental threats, especially from climate change, 
environmental sociology has become increasingly focused on uncertainty and precaution. 
 
Frank Furedi, for example, argues that scepticism about the capacity of science and 
technology to adequately identify and manage environmental risks has encouraged the 
dramatisation of uncertainty. As a result, probabilistic risk management of the 
environment ‘competes with and often gives way to possiblistic-driven worst case 
policies’, energised largely by ‘intuition’ rather than reason-based calculation (Furedi 
2009: 205-6). 
 
Francois Ewald makes a similar claim. In the face of a ‘disturbed relationship with 
science’, the certainty founded on risk calculation is being displaced by an assumption of 
uncertainty and the necessity for precaution. Echoing Ulrich Beck’s (1982) theoristion of 
the rise of the ‘risk society’ and politics, Ewald makes the claim that a new ‘economy of 
rights and duties’ is emerging wherein responsibility reflects precaution (Ewald 2002: 
247). 
 
For his part, Chris Shaw argues that high-stakes environmental uncertainty, such as that 
associated with climate change, is both discursively constructed and limited. Through an 
analysis of the widely held consensus that 2° is the ‘dangerous limit’ of global warming, 
Shaw (2010: 106) argues that the response of policy makers to uncertainty is to try to 
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emulate rather than displace risk calculation. But in adopting this strategy, Shaw contends 
(2010: 117), this ‘dangerous limit’ narrative of the policy makers resists the more 
complex and indeterminate aspects of the uncertainty of climate change, becoming ‘a 
“convenient trope”, a “necessarily simple abstraction”, which turns the problem into “a 
viable object of decision making”’. 
 
These are valuable sociological insights into the way uncertainty and precaution are being 
formulated in regard to environmental risk, particularly the risk of climate change. They 
can be complemented by a different set of insights, into the nitty-gritty of the complex 
legal mechanisms being forged in common-law countries to guide institutional and 
individual actors as to how the law calculates risk, particularly through the formulation of 
a technical legal device, ‘the precautionary principle’. This paper, in addressing a small 
element of this lacuna in the sociological debate about environmental risks, focuses on 
legal deliberations of the risks of climate change in one region of Australia, the 
Gippsland coast in Victoria. 
 
Climate change adaptation in coastal areas has become a matter of significant policy 
interest at all levels of government. There has been a push to develop coordinated 
strategies and alliances to manage adaptation
i
, but also a consensus that there is no one-
size-fits-all adaptation strategy available. Rather, this policy strategy, emphasises that 
adaptation needs to be tailored to the specific risks presented by local social and 
environmental conditions. As Jan McDonald (2010: 11) observes, ‘law and legal 
institutions constitute a critical component of society’s adaptive capacity’. The law 
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operates at both a general and particular level to shape climate change adaptation. It 
establishes general rules, such as those which direct decision makers to evaluate climate 
change effects as part of a larger environmental assessment, and through litigation the 
law defines the local and particular application of those general rules. In this way, the law 
is a prime means by which the risks associated with climate change are evaluated. Indeed, 
as Nicholas de Sadeleer (2002: 3) puts it, risk evaluation is the ‘activating concept of 
environmental law’; it is a pivotal technique in the legal calculation and delineation of 
environmental responsibilities and rights. 
 
In this spirit, the present paper focuses on recent litigation in the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)
ii
 relating to planning and development in Gippsland 
which has both highlighted and generated legal uncertainty as to how adaptation 
strategies and regulations will impact on the rights and obligations of councils, land 
owners, developers and communities. The litigation has been an impetus to action on 
climate change adaptation, not only because it has effectively prohibited development in 
certain coastal areas vulnerable to the effects of climate change, but also because it has 
drawn political and public attention to the apparent seriousness of the risk of coastal 
climate change damage. 
 
The law, risk and uncertainty in the Gippsland Coastal Board case 
Land use planning has become one of the most visible ways by which the law has been 
used to introduce climate change adaptation in coastal areas (McDonald 2010: 14). 
However, prior to the 2008 decision of Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
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(VCAT) in Gippsland Coastal Board v South Gippsland Shire Council (No. 2)
iii
 the 
possible adverse impact of climate change was not a matter which planning law in 
Victoria took into consideration at all. The Gippsland VCAT cases are among the first 
planning cases which were required to consider the legal obligations that attach to 
predicted adverse climate change impacts. The decisions forced a departure from the 
assumed planning status quo. They were confronting because they directed attention to 
‘relevance of climate change to planning decision making process’, which VCAT notes is 




In the Gippsland Coastal Board case VCAT was asked to review planning approval 
given by the South Gippsland Shire Council for the building of six dwellings on low-
lying coastal agricultural land. The Gippsland Coastal Board challenged the approval, 
arguing on the basis of a 2006 CSIRO climate change study of the Gippsland coast that 
the proposed properties would be at risk from rising sea levels and coastal inundation 
caused by climate change. The interests and views heard by the Tribunal were limited to 
those of the applicant, the objector and any experts that each party called upon. No 
individuals who had alternate or conflicting interests took any part in the proceedings. 
Within the limited parameters of the matters considered by VCAT, the expert CSIRO 
prediction of adverse climate change effects took on a special significance in the case. It 
allowed the Tribunal to link its reasoning to a wider climate change discourse beyond the 
evidence elicited in the case. VCAT expressly stated that it did not adopt the CSIRO’s 
findings, because they had not been subject to any ‘rigorous examination in the 
proceedings’. The Tribunal nevertheless found the findings were in line with, 
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a general consensus that some level of climate change will result in extreme 
weather conditions beyond the historical record that planners and others rely on in 
assessing future potential impacts. It is, in our view no longer sufficient to rely 
only on what has gone before to assess what may happen again in the context of 
coastal processes, sea levels or for that matter inundation from coastal or inland 
storm events (para 40). 
 
The untested CSIRO evidence in combination with this ‘general consensus’ persuaded 
VCAT that the predicted adverse effects of climate change were so ‘significant’ (in terms 
of section 60(1)(e) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987), as to impose an 
obligation on the Tribunal to consider the predicted ‘environmental effect’ of climate 
change on the proposed ‘use or development’ of the coastal land. Ultimately, from 
VCAT’s perspective, the CSIRO’s scientific evidence framed an understanding that 
rendered the uncertainty associated with the potential impact of climate change less 
significant than the confident consensus that there will inevitably be adverse impacts in 
coastal areas. 
 
The Gippsland Coastal Board case was notable because VCAT determined that it was 
obliged to act outside the established parameters of planning law and policy to avoid 
harm, the Tribunal justified its decision by reference to the fact that:  
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The relevance of climate change to the planning decision making process is still 
in an evolutionary phase. Each case concerning possible impacts of climate 
change will turn on its own facts and circumstances (para 47). 
 
The ‘facts and circumstances’ of the Gippsland Coastal Board case led the Tribunal to 
decide it was necessary to adopt a precautionary approach and overturn the Shire’s 
planning approval. The application of the precautionary principle was a device, which 
simultaneously recognised environmental and legal uncertainty while transforming each 
into matters certain enough to invoke legal responsibility and enable a decision. 
 
Legal and policy implications of taking a precautionary approach 
 
The Gippsland Coastal Board decision directly led to the introduction of a new policy 
framework in Victoria
v
, mandating consideration of climate change impact in coastal 
areas. The new coastal policy regime entrenches the precautionary approach, which in the 
context of available scientific predictions of sea level rise and the extent of coastal 
inundation, places significant limits on small-scale development in established coastal 
settlements as well as larger subdivisions on the coast outside existing settlement (Allens 
Arthur Robinson 2010).  
 
In a subsequent 2009 case, Myers v South Gippsland Shire Council
vi
, VCAT summed up 
the current legal and policy position:  
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Combined, the breadth of documents addressing climate change that are now 
available as background information or policies, identify that one thing is certain, 
the issue of climate change and the impact on coastal communities is an issue that 
can no longer be ignored. As decision makers we can no longer leave the issue for 
the next generation to sort out. … [48] Common sense tells us that, following this 
approach, the Tribunal should not approve coastal developments that are likely to 
be unduly threatened by future flooding and/or coastal inundation, creating a mess 
to be dealt with by future generations (emphasis added). 
Despite the claimed ‘common sense’ of what now seems to be an entrenched legal and 
policy position, VCAT’s decision in the Gippsland Coastal Board case was not 
inevitable or unproblematic. As already noted there was no available policy or regulation 
on climate change adaptation available to guide the Tribunal’s deliberations or direct it to 
adopt the precautionary approach. This policy and regulatory vacuum, in combination 
with the limited scope of the VCAT hearing process, and the necessarily ad hoc and 
selective impact of this type of litigation, exacerbates the potential for the Gippsland 
Coastal Board decision to be perceived as undermining recognised proprietorial interests, 
and cultural expectations. In addition, by raising the spectre of future legal liability for 
regulatory authorities and developers who fail to take appropriate adaptive action, the 
decision potentially prioritises climate change impact over other environmental concerns 
in Gippsland such as subsidence and lake salinity.  
 
The legal narrative of precaution in the face of climate change 
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Just as there was a policy vacuum, there was no straightforward legal precedent for the 
governance of climate change adaptation available to guide VCAT’s deliberations in the 
Gippsland Coastal Board case. However, a precautionary legal rationale was developing 
almost simultaneously in ‘mitigation litigation’ in the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court
vii
. This rationale focuses on whether there should be an obligation on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) intensive developments, such as big mines and industrial sites, to 
account for and mitigate downstream emissions
viii
. In this mitigation litigation, the 
precautionary principle and intergenerational equity, both key principles of ecologically 
sustainable development, have been taken up and do substantial rhetorical work justifying 
and insisting upon an interpretation of environmental law which requires stronger 
accountability for the downstream effects of GHG (Bonyhady 2007: 19-20; Peel 2008). 
These arguments have met with some notable success in the NSW Land and Environment 
Court. Brian Preston, the Court’s Chief Justice has argued judicially
ix
 and extra-judicially 
(Preston 2005; 2010) that the approach taken by his court has been justified because ‘the 
impacts of climate change are of such seriousness, magnitude and extent’ (Preston 2010: 
201). VCAT has taken a similar position in the coastal climate change litigation. 
 
The precautionary principle has been used as an aid to environmental decision making for 
at least a decade (E. Fisher 2007). It has served to supplement the concept of 
intergenerational equity, which was merely aspirational and ‘devoid of legal life’ before 
the NSW mitigation litigation discussed above (Bonyhady 2007: 20). Now, through this 
climate change litigation, these two principles of sustainable development, working in 
combination, provide a normative basis for the legal recognition of the need to mitigate 
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and take adaptive action to prevent irreversible damage, in the name of future social and 
environmental wellbeing. Significantly, as environmental lawyer Douglas Fisher has 
observed, invoking these two key principles of sustainable development extends the 
scope of the environmental law to incorporate the longer term, and geographically more 
extensive, impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (D. Fisher 2007: 
217). 
 
Conclusion – making the possible probable 
 
The operation of the precautionary principle ‘does not direct a particular outcome to 
occur … it regulates reasons for a decision and the process by which a decision is made’ 
(E. Fisher 2007: 41). The Gippsland Coastal Board case and subsequent VCAT 
decisions, while ruling against certain development applications, do not specify how 
regulators should respond to the uncertainties of climate change or what adaptive 
measures they should implement. The Tribunal assumes that adaptation is an ongoing 
task for all levels of government, requiring an integrated, holistic approach mindful of 
localised impact and interests. Although not prescriptive, VCAT’s application of the 
precautionary principle has had a substantive normative impact. As de Sadeleer observes, 
the precautionary principle ‘transforms doubt into possible certainty and hence 
strengthens action by public authorities in the face of uncertainty’ (2002: 222). Ewald 
might conclude it has become the basis for justifying a new set of environmental 
responsibilities in the face of climate change. Not unlike the emergence of the 2° 
‘dangerous limit’ of global warming narrative analysed by Shaw (2010), the Gippsland 
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Coastal Board case has been the impetus for the emergence of another type of narrative, 
which makes the coastal impact of climate change ‘a viable object’ of legal decision-
making. The risk of legal liability coupled with VCAT’s insistence on the commonsense 
of a precautionary approach, effectively renders the uncertainty attaching to predicted 
adverse effects of climate change otiose – the possible has become, for legal and policy 
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